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STATEMENT OlMIIKIKIkU "I'lON 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. Appellant appeals from the final order of Third District Court, Salt Lake 
Department, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding, granting judgment in favor of appellee Brian 
James Messerich and Annika Falkenrath Messerich. The instant appeal was commenced in the Utah 
Court of Appeals on or about the 12th day of March, 2008 with jurisdiction conferred upon that court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR RE1!TEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No, 1: Did the District Court (Hilder) have jurisdiction to grant Appellee an order 
terminating appellant's parental rights. STANDARD < *F REVIEW: "When a motion to vacate a 
judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction 
is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs. 
Therefore, the propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, 
becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court" Franklin Covey Client 
Sales, Inc. v. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110. In the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion, the 
appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of review. 
Mensies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81. Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are questions 
of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower court decisions. 
Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite. Inc., 201 UT App 347,37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez, 896 
P.2d 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
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Issue No. 2: Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by hearing the case or not 
remanding the case for further hearing to hear the evidence. STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue 
regarding a conclusion of law is reviewed with a correction of error standard. Statev.Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994), The trial court's findings of face are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst 846 P.2d 1282,1286 (Utah 1993) and Mensies v. Galetka, 2006 
UT 81. Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed 
for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. 
Insure-Rite.Inc 201 UT App 347,37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez. 896 P.2d 38,39 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err and abused its discretion by not looking beyond the plain 
language of the relinquishment statute, Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4.20, to legislative history and public 
policy to ascertain the statutes' intent. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A trial court has discretion in 
determining whether a movant has shown [rule 60(b) grounds], and this court will reverse the trial 
court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
v. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110. More specifically, in the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion, 
the appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of review. 
Mensies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81. See also Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 
1993).Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are questions of law thai are reviewed 
for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. 
Insure-Rite.Inc, 201 UT App 347,37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38,39 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
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Issue No. 4: Whether the court abused its discretion by not looking to legislative 
intent and finding that Section 78-30-4.20 applies not only to an unmarried biological father but to 
a natural father who was married to the natural mother at the time of adoption. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW:: "A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown [rule 60(b) 
grounds], and this court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of 
discretion." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110. More specifically, in 
the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion, the appellate court reviews a district court's findings 
of fact under a clear error standard of review. Mensies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81. In this case, the trial 
court abused its discretion by not looking beyond the language of the statute and to legislative intent 
to determine if 78-30-4.20 applies to not only an unmarried biological father, but also to a natural 
father who was married to the natural mother at the time of the adoption. Questions of jurisdiction 
and statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no 
particular deference to lower court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 201 UT 
App 347, 37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39 (Utah U. App. 1995). 
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not considering the 
best interest of the children. STANDARD OF REVIEW: : "A trial court has discretion in 
determining whether a movant has shown [rule 60(b) grounds], and this court will reverse the trial 
court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110. More specifically, in the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion, 
the appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of review. 
Mensies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by not looking 
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beyond the language of the statute and to legislative intent to determine the best interest of the 
children. 
Issue No, 6: Whether the court abused its discretion by finding that the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel, waiver and laches do not prevent enforcement of appellant's 
relinquishment. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A trial court has discretion in determining whether 
a movant has shown [rule 60(b) grounds], and this court will reverse the trial court's ruling only 
when there has been an abuse of discretion." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT 
App 110. More specifically, in the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion, the appellate court 
reviews a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of review. Mensies v. Galetka, 
2006 UT 81. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by not looking beyond the language 
of the statute and to legislative intent to determine the best interest of the children. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The statutory authorities listed above in the Table of Authorities are either determinative in 
this appeal or are of such central importance as to merit their inclusion herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, the 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding, denying Petitioner's Motion to Vacate or Reconsider. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 
The parties, Brandon Sieverts and Annika Falkenrath Messerich, are the parents of the minor 
children: Rex Bryant Falkenrath Sieverts, date of birth 16 August, 2002; Reagan Elizabeth 
Falkenrath Sieverts, date of birth 16 August, 2002; Andrew Marcus Falkenrath Sieverts, date of birth 
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23 January, 2004; and Orion Jeremy Falkenrath Sieverts, date of birth 23 January, 2004. 
The parents of the children divorced in August 2005. The Decree of Divorce between Mr. 
Sieverts and Ms. Messerich was signed by Judge Peuler on August 26, 2005, and entered in the 
Registry of Judgements on August 29, 2005. 
Less than one month later, on September 24, 2005, Mr. Sieverts signed an "Affidavit and 
Waiver, Consent and Relinquishment of Legal Father" (Affidavit) and agreed that the children could 
be adopted by the mother's fiance. On that same date, Mr. Sieverts signed a Stipulation to modify 
the divorce Decree (before a notary public), which Stipulation incorporated the Affidavit and 
requested the Court to acknowledge the relinquishment, but nevertheless preserved the children's 
right to support prospectively. 
On October 14, 2005, Judge Peuler rejected the Stipulation and denied the request for 
modification. Judge Peuler stated two cogent reasons for her refusal. First, Judge Peuler noted that, 
"[a] relinquishment of parental rights may occur only in the District Court in the context of an 
adoption proceeding. It may not occur in a divorce action." There was no adoption proceeding 
pending in October, 2005, nor could there have been because Appellee had not remarried. The effect 
of Judge Peuler's first conclusion was that she had no jurisdiction to act on any termination of rights. 
Judge Peuler provided a second reason for declining to approve the Stipulation and modify the 
Decree; namely, her determination that it did not appear to be in the best interests of the children to 
leave them without a father figure for any interim period between a termination or relinquishment 
of rights, and an adoption by a stepparent. Judge Peuler ordered that "The Decree of Divorce of 
Divorce remains in full force and effect, without modification." 
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The next activity also occurred in the divorce case; namely, Mr. Sieverts filed a Rule 60(b) 
Motion in relation to their Decree of Divorce on or about November 23, 2005. After an exchange 
of Affidavits and argument before Commissioner Evans, the Commissioner recommended that the 
Motion be denied. Mr. Sieverts filed a timely Objection to the recommendation, .and Judge Peuler 
ultimately held three days' of evidentiary hearings regarding the Motion, resulting in her Minute 
Entry of July 26, 2006, denying the Motion. 
It is clear from the record that both at the time that Mr. Sieverts signed the Affidavit and the 
Stipulation to Modify the Decree, as well as at the time of the filing of the Rule 60(b) Motion, there 
was, in fact, no prospective stepparent identified by Ms. Messerich. 
Subsequent to the divorce, the mother Appellee married Brian Messerich on February 10, 
2007. Mr. Sieverts, the natural father, continued to visit with the children and pay child support 
following Appellee's remarriage to Mr. Messerich. In fact, Mr. Sieverts visited the children 
significantly more than he was entitled to under the Decree of Divorce and continued to pay child 
support. In addition to Mr. Sieverts' discussions with Appellee and Appellee's actions, Mr. Sieverts' 
had a very reasonable expectation that visitation would continue in accordance with the parties' 
Decree of Divorce based on Judge Peuler's October 15, 2005 ruling. 
On April 30,2007, less than three months after Appellee's remarriage, she filed a Petition 
to Determine Parental Rights. The Court's records indicate that a separate action, case number 
072900213, was filed as an adoption proceeding on the same date by Brian and Annika Messerich. 
That action is presently assigned to Judge John Paul Kennedy. 
The Petition to Determine Parental Rights was assigned to Judge Peuler, the same Judge who 
was assigned to the divorce action between the mother and father. Counsel for the petitioner sought 
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entry of an Order Terminating Rights, based on the existing Affidavit and Waiver, Consent and 
Relinquishment of Legal Father, signed by Mr. Sieverts in 2005. On April 30, 2007, Judge Peuler 
was apparently unavailable to review the document. At that time, Judge Peuler was Presiding Judge 
to this District, and Judge Hilder was the Associate Presiding Judge. The Petition and proposed 
Order was brought to Judge Hilder in his capacity as Associate Presiding Judge, and he signed the 
Order Terminating Rights based on the Affidavit and Waiver executed by Mr. Sieverts in 2005. Mr. 
Sieverts did not receive any notice regarding this action. From that time to present Mr. Sieverts has 
not been afforded any visitation and contact with the children. 
On or about June 6,2007, Judge Hilder received a short letter from Mr. Sieverts, objecting 
to the termination of his parental rights. Mr. Sieverts sent the letter after hearing that the court 
entered the Order Terminating Rights. Mr. Sieverts letter was the first time Judge Hilder became 
aware of either the divorce action, or Judge Peuler's prior determination in 2005. As Judge Hilder's 
Minute Entry of June 10, 2007, indicates, he consulted briefly With Judge Peuler, and they agreed 
that because Judge Hilder signed the Order, he should consider any objection to the Order. The 
Minute Entry also indicates that Judge Hilder chose to treat the letter as a Motion to Reconsider or 
Vacate the Order. 
Judge Hilder agreed to consider Mr. Sieverts' Objection. Mr. Sieverts retained counsel, 
Stephen R. Cook, and both sides briefed the issue before the Court. After a delay, oral argument 
was heard on August 29, 2007, and Judge Hilder took the matter under advisement. Judge Hilder 
issued a Tentative Ruling and Request for Additional Briefing on October 30, 2007. The 
attorneys submitted their additional briefing. Judge Hilder issued his Ruling on February 18, 
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2008. Mr. Sieverts subsequently filed this timely appeal appealing the denial of his Motion to 
Reconsider or Vacate the Order. 
C. DISPOSITION AT HEARING 
The District Court ruled as follows: 
1. Petitioner's Motion to Vacate or Reconsider was denied. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge erred when he did not immediately grant Mr. Sieverts' Motion to Reconsider 
or Vacate and when he ultimately denied Mr. Sieverts' Motion to Reconsider or Vacate, thus 
upholding Appellee's Petition to Determine Parental Rights and the Order Terminating Rights. This 
court should reverse the trial court's Ruling and remand with instructions to vacate the 
relinquishment and Order Terminating Rights and bar Appellees from enforcing the Relinquishment 
on these grounds. 
Judge Hilder's Ruling denying Mr. Sieverts his parental rights is plain error. The trial court 
should have set aside Mr. Sieverts' relinquishment and waiver for adoption because the court did not 
have grounds and jurisdiction to consider the matter and enter the Order on April 30, 2007. The 
Court's Ruling improperly overturned Judge Peuler's Ruling where she had already denied the 
Relinquishment and Waiver and ruled the original Decree of Divorce remain in full force and effect. 
Mr. Sieverts relied on this and continued his relationship with his children, including paying child 
support and spending time with the children in excess of that allowed in the parties' decree. This 
court should reverse the trial courts Ruling and Order Terminating Rights and remand with 
instructions to grant Mr. Sieverts' motion and vacate the relinquishment and restore Appellant's 
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parental rights in accordance with the parties Decree of Divorce and Judge Peuler' s Order of October 
15, 2005 on these grounds. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE PROPER 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE CASE AND TERMINATE 
APPELLANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS 
The trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear this matter and terminate appellant's 
parental rights. "When a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack of 
jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot 
stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety 
of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, becomes a question 
of law upon which we do not defer to the district court" Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110. In the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion, the appellate 
court reviews a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of review. 
Mensies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81. Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are 
questions of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower 
court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 201 UT App 347, 37 P.3d 
1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the trial court 
abused its discretion by not immediately granting Appellant's Motion to Vacate or 
Reconsider and by hearing the case. Marshaled evidence supporting findings: Judge Hilder 
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relied on the Petition of Appellee and the terms of the relinquishment and affidavit and 
statutory provisions. 
Judge Hilder improperly reversed Judge Peuler's prior Order in making his Ruling, 
thus violating the "law of the case" doctrine. As noted, Judge Peuler rejected the Appellee's 
request to recognize and enter the relinquishment to terminate Appellant's parental rights on 
October 14,2005. Appellee filed the exact same relinquishment and waiver papers signed 
by Appellant in 2005 as she did in this action petitioning the court to determine parental 
rights again on April 30,2007. This time she did it without any notice to Appellant. Judge 
Hilder improperly accepted Appellee's Petition and signed her proposed Order eind reversed 
Judge Peuler's prior Order, thus violating the "law of the case" doctrine. The Utah Supreme 
Court stated: "We have repeatedly indicated that one district court judge cannot overrule 
another district court judge of equal authority." Mascaro v. Davis. 741 P.2d 938, 946-47 
(Utah 1987). Mascaro v. Davis further notes that "law of the case doctrine" is consistent 
with Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-19 and § 78-7-20 that prohibits subsequent applications to a 
court for an order which has been denied or granted conditionally by another judge. 741 P.2d 
at 947. The only exceptions to this rule are not relevant here. The issue was not presented 
in a "different light" as when further discovery changes the propriety of summary judgement. 
Red Flame v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, 996 P.2d 540, 542. Nor was there "change in the 
relevant law" or evidence that Judge Peuler's prior order was "clearly erroneous." Id. Here, 
Appellee had remarried less than three months prior to her refiling her request with the court, 
but that would not qualify Appellee and her husband to adopt the children under the law. 
(See discussion regarding adoption and relinquishment herein). The issue was therefore not 
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presented in a different light. Mr. Sieverts, the natural father, continued to visit with the 
children and pay child support following Judge Peuler's decision in 2005 and Appellee's 
remarriage to Mr. Messerich. In fact, Mr. Sieverts visited the children significantly more 
than he was entitled to under the Decree of Divorce and continued to pay child support. 
Visitation and Mr. Sieverts' involvement in the children's life continued in accordance with 
the parties' Decree of Divorce as ordered by Judge Peuler's oft October 15,2005. "The law 
of the case doctrine is employed to avoid delay and prevent injustice." Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Construction. 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Here Judge Hilder created 
injustice by not granting Mr. Sieverts' motion and entering his ruling terminating Mr. 
Sieverts' parental rights. The Decree of Divorce of Divorce should have remained in foil 
force and effect, without modification. In the least, Appellee's adoption case should have 
been dismissed or consolidated with this case and heard on ttie merits. 
Because of Judge Hilder's error in not immediately granting Mr. Sieverts' Motion to 
Vacate, Mr. Sieverts has been deprived of any visitation with his children as provided in the 
Decree, which includes the deprivation of developing a relationship and bond with his 
children and enjoying that love and affection. He has continued to pay child support, yet lost 
out on the reduction in child support he was entitled to under the Decree for extended 
visitation pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.11. Mr. Sieverts was required to retain counsel and 
spend unnecessary time and money arguing his motion that should have been immediately 
granted. 
Additionally, Judge Hilder heavily relied on certain provisions of the adoptions 
statute in his Ruling, yet ignored the most important and applicable provision as it relates to 
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this case and jurisdiction. Pursuant to Utah law regarding step-parent adoption, the law 
requires that the children reside in the home with the proposed stepfather for at least one 
year. See U.C.A. §78-30-14(7)(b). Furthermore, pursuant to Utah law, a relinquishment of 
parental rights may only occur in the District Court in the context of an adoption proceeding. 
In this case, the appellees were not married for one year prior to filing their Petition to 
Determine Parental Rights, therefore, there were not proper grounds for the Court to consider 
Appellee's motion and the subsequent arguments. Furthermore, U.C.A.. §78-30-4.16 (2)(b) 
provides that "If there are not proper grounds to terminate the person's parental rights, the 
court shall: (iii) award custody of the child in accordance with the child's best interest." The 
district court took no evidence regarding the children's best interests, and in fact stated, 
"there is no need for judicial inquiry into the best interests of the children." (Judge 
Hider'sRuling, Page 5). Here, the District Court should have ordered the parties' Divorce 
Decree remain in full force and effect, as was done by Judge Peuler on October 15, 2005, 
when she denied the relinquishment pursuant to the Stipulation filed by Appellee. 
The trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear this matter and terminate appellant's 
parental rights. Judge Hilder's Ruling cannot stand without denying due process to 
Appellant. The trial court abused its discretion by not immediately granting Appellant's 
Motion to Vacate or Reconsider. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY NOT REMANDING THE CASE FOR 
FURTHER HEARING TO HEAR THE EVIDENCE 
Judge Hilder inappropriately accepted Appellee's Petition and proposed Order 
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inconsistent with Utah law. Marshaled evidence supporting findings: Judge Hilder relied on 
the terms of the relinquishment and affidavit and statutory provisions. 
Even though Sieverts' relinquishment "was effective when signed" Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-30-4.20, Sieverts' rights and responsibilities are not terminated until the 
adoption decree is entered under Utah law: 
The birth parents of an adopted child are, from time to time the final 
decree of adotion is entered, released from all parental duties toward 
and all responsibilities for the adopted child, and have no further 
rights with regard to the child. Utah Code Ann §78-30-11. 
The clear conclusion is that Mr. Sieverts' retains some ifrchoate rights until the decree 
is entered. Moreover, Utah Statute permits "any interested party" to petition the court "for 
a determination of the rights and interest of any person who may claim an interest in a child" 
before an adoption petition is filed. Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.24. Accordingly, the 
plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.24 permits his intervention. Sieverts 
contends that he is an interested party based upon his blood relationship and adoption of the 
minor children and the affection he developed for the children through living with them and 
caring for them and providing substantial support for them after he signed the 
relinquishment. Furthermore, the adoption statute further provides that "the court shall 
examine each person appearing before it" and that "the court shall make a specific finding 
regarding the best interest of the child " Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-9. Because 
Sieverts had relevant evidence about the interest of the children and the suitability of the 
adoptive home, the court should have allowed him to be heard. While only parents have the 
"right" to custody and notice, various other persons may be granted "standing" to be heard 
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regarding a child's custody. See Wilson v. Family Servs. Div. Region Two, 554 P.2d 227, 
231 (Utah 1976) (Grandmother has "some dormant or inchoate right or interest in the custody 
and welfare of the children who become parentless"). Utah courts have granted standing in 
custody and adoption matters to various persons who, like Mr. Sieverts, have no right to 
custody but have an interest in the child. Therefore, even if the court determined that Mr. 
Sieverts relinquishment was effective when signed he should not be precluded from putting 
forth evidence regarding the best interests of the children. (Judge Hilder's Ruling, Page 7). 
Although Mr. Sieverts was entitled to the rights of a parent "he should have been seen as 
having an interest in the proceeding." The Utah Supreme Court's general test for standing 
first looks to whether the party has "a legally protected interest in the controversy" and can 
show "some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of 
the legal dispute." Kennecott Corp v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451,454, quoting Jenkins 
v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145,1148,1150 (Utah 1983). "If the Plaintiff has no standing under the 
first step, then he may have standing if no one has a greater interest then he and if the issue 
is unlikely to be raised at all if the Plaintiff is denied standing." Id at 454 quoting Jenkins 
675 P.2d at 1150. As stated above Sieverts rights and responsibilities are not terminated 
until the adoption decree is entered under Utah law. (Utah Code Annotaled § 78-30-4.20). 
Additionally, Mr. Sieverts continued, and continues to pay child support and interact with 
the children, yet has been deprived visitation and developing a relationship with his children 
since Judge Hilder granted Appellee's Petition. 
The Utah Supreme Court thoroughly set forth considerations for granting standing 
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in contested custody cases in State in Interest of JWF v. Schoolcraft, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 
1990) (holding that a step-father had standing to seek custody of a child he had never 
parented). The court concluded: 
There is no reason to narrowly restrict participation in custodial proceedings. 
Indeed, our case law and the legislatures pronouncements indicate that the 
interests of the child are best served when those interested in the child are 
permitted to assert that interest. The question of who should have custody of 
the child is too important to exclude participants on narrowly drawn 
technical grounds those who have legal or personal connections with the 
child should not precluded from being heard on best interests. Id. 799 P.2d 
at 716. 
Mr. Sieverts should have had the opportunity to spe&k to the best interests of the 
children under these standards given his rights and responsibilities are not terminated until 
an adoption decree is entered, given the concern he has demonstrated for his children, given 
the relationship he has for his children and given the support he has provided to his children. 
The Utah Legislature has set forth the proper standard to protect the interests of the child 
which the legislature has determined "should govern and be bf most concern." Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-30-1.5. It makes sense, therefore, that the relinquishing parent should be 
afforded the opportunity to put forth evidence on the best interest of the child because he or 
she may be in the best position to discover that the adoptive family has certain undisclosed 
weaknesses or inadequacies. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY NOT LOOKING BEYOND 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE 
RELINQUISHMENT STATUTE, UTAH CODE 
ANN. 78-30-4.20, TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
AND PUBLIC POLICY TO ASCERTAIN THE 
STATUTES' INTENT 
The court erred in not looking beyond the plain language of the relinquishment 
statute, Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.20, to legislative history and public policy to 
ascertain the statutes intents. Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are 
questions of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower 
court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 201 UT App 347, 37 P.3d 
1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Findings: Judge Hillder's 
ruling makes the following pertinent findings with respect to legislative intent. On 
September 24, 2005, Mr. Sieverts executed a relinquishment petition and corresponding 
affidavit. Mr. Sieverts acted with deliberate clarity and full knowledge of the 
relinquishment's effect and the ramifications stemming therefrom. 
Marshaled evidence supporting findings: Judge Hilder relied on the terms of the 
relinquishment and affidavit and statutory provisions, specifically Utah Code Annotated § 
78-30-4.12 through § 78-30-4.20. The relinquishment and affidavit was the extent of 
evidence submitted by Appellee in support of their position that Appellant's Motion to 
Reconsider and Vacate should be denied and that the relinquishment was adequate under 
Utah law. 
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A relinquishment may be set aside for "fraud, undue influence and for good cause 
shown " In re Adoption of K, 465 P.2d 541, 542 (Utah 1970). Utah case law establishes 
that "when consent is given in court before a judge, there is & presumption of regularity." 
Matter of S.. 572 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1977). However, procedural irregularities also justify 
setting aside a relinquishment. In Taylor v. Waddoups, 241 P.2d 157, 159 (Utah 1952) the 
court set aside a relinquishment because it was signed before a notary public, not before a 
judge, and a notary was no longer sanctioned by statute to take relinquishments. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that there had been "no legal consent given" under those 
circumstances. Id. at 160. This procedural irregularity was later noted as "the most 
important and controlling fact" in Taylor v. Waddoups by the Utah Supreme Court. In re 
Adoption of D, 252 P.2d 223, 227 (Utah 1953). In this case no court was involved, rather 
Appellant was baited into Appellee's attorneys' office to sign the relinquishment. When a 
court was involved upon Appellee requesting it to recognize and enforce the relinquishment, 
it refused to recognize it and ordered that the terms of the parties original decree remain in 
full force and effect. (See above). Therefore, the trial court should have ruled that the 
relinquishment may be set aside. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
NOT LOOKING TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND FINDING 
THAT SECTION 78-30-4.20 APPLIES NOT ONLY TO AN 
UNMARRIED BIOLOGICAL FATHER BUT TO A NATURAL 
FATHER WHO WAS MARRIED TO THE NATURAL 
MOTHER AT THE TIME OF ADOPTION. 
The trial court erred by not looking to legislative intent and finding that § 78-30-4.20 
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applies not only to unmarried biological fathers but to a natural father who was married to 
the natural mother at the time of the adoption. The court erred in failing to grant Sieverts' 
motion. Findings: Judge Hilder's ruling makes the following pertinent finding with respect 
to statutory interpretation and whether the court should look behind the plain language 
relinquishment statute. The court found the statutory language unequivocal and that the clear 
statement that a relinquishment cannot be revoked reveals no ambiguity that would trigger 
a need to look behind the plain language of the statute itself and consider legislative intent. 
Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed 
for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake 
Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 201 UT App 347, 37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 
39 (Utah Q. App. 1995). 
A review of the adoption code reveals numerous sections that affect not only 
unmarried biological fathers, but the rights of various adoption proceedings including the 
birth mother, married biological fathers, unmarried biological fathers and guardians. 
Furthermore, the court found that there is a fundamental policy underlying the adoption code 
for permanency and finality and order to minimize effort, expense and emotional 
involvement experienced in the process. Marshaled evidence supporting findings: Judge 
Hilder relied on Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.14 to4.21 and Savage v. Utah Youth Bill., 
2004 UT 102 and Adams v. Swenson. 2005 UT 8 and Utah Pub. Employees Ass, NV State 
2006 UT 9 and in re Adoption of F. 26 2d 255. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY NOT 
CONSIDERING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN. 
The trial court erred in failing to consider the best interests of the children. 
The court found that the best interest standard only arises if the court determines that 
consent has not been obtained. The court relied on Utah Code Annotated § 78-3 0-4.16(1 )(2) 
in making this determination. Furthermore, the court found that if consent is not obtained 
and there are not proper grounds to terminate parental rights, the court must dismiss the 
adoption petition. Only then may the court conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine 
custody based on a child's best interest. In making this finding the court relied on Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-3-4.16 (2)(b). The court furthermore found that Mr. Sievert's consent was 
clearly obtained and that there is no need for judicial inquiry into the best interests of the 
children. The court relied on Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.16(2)(a). The court erred in 
failing to grant Mr. Sievert's motion. Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation 
are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower 
court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 201 UT App 347, 37 P.3d 
1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In re E.H. involves a mother who was seeking to be involved in a "best interest" 
hearing for her natural son despite a relinquishment order being upheld by the District Court. 
137 P.3d 809 (Utah 2006). Under section 78-30-4.16 of the Utah code a "best interests" 
hearing would occur only after the petition for adoption may not be granted. Id. at 819. 
Which means that if the relinquishment were valid, then there would be no need consider a 
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custody, or "best interests" hearing. Id. The court went on to say, "[ajlthough the district 
court's determination that the mother's relinquishment was lawful freed it of a duty to 
conduct this custody hearing under section 78-30-4.16, that ruling did not relieve the court 
of its statutory responsibility to conduct a meaningful inquiry into whether the proposed 
adoption of E.H. was consistent with his best interests. That duty is assigned to the court 
under the provisions of section 78-30-9, which directs the court to 'examine each person 
appearing before it in accordance with this chapter, separately, and, if satisfied that the 
interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, it shall enter a final decree of 
adoption.'" Id. The court in Seiverts case did not conduct a "best interests" inquiry, which 
could only be done if Seiverts did not have standing or the power to intervene. Id. 
"In general, standing is available only to a person who has sustained some injury to 
her legal, personal, or property rights. The district court believed that its determination that 
the mother's relinquishment was lawful conclusively denied her standing in the subsequent 
adoption hearing. The district court reasoned that because the relinquishment left the mother 
with no right or interest that could be affected by the proceeding, she lacked standing to 
participate in those proceedings. We need not rule today whether all of the mother's interests 
in E.H. were extinguished; however, because even if we were to accept this line of reasoning 
as true, the presence or absence of parental rights does not determine whether a person has 
standing to intervene in an adoption proceeding." Id. at 819-20. Even if the court finds 
Seiverts relinquishment valid, he could still find standing to intervene and present evidence 
as to the "best interests" of his children. 
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Intervention is the act by which a third party obtains standing to become a 
party in a suit. It has been described as a method by which an outsider with 
an interest in an action may enter and participate as a party. To justify 
intervention, the party seeking intervention must demonstrate a direct interest 
in the subject matter of the litigation such that the intervenor's rights may be 
affected, for good or for ill. The requisite interest necessary to permit 
intervention may arise from the intervenor's status or her circumstances. Rule 
24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs intervention as 
of right, describes the connection that must exist between a persons status or 
circumstances and the lawsuit in order to justify intervention, stating: 
When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property 
or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, 
unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by the 
existing parties. 
Id. at 820. 
After discussing the statutory granting of standing to intervene the court stated 
A mother, like E.H.'s mother, who has relinquished her parental rights does 
not have a right to receive notice and is excluded from the class of persons 
upon which the statute confers a right to intervene and present best interests 
evidence. However, by merely extending to a particular class of persons an 
express invitation to intervene in an adoption and present best interests 
evidence, Utah Code section 78-30-4.13(11) does not foreclose the possibility 
that other persons may, by reason of status or circumstance, also be eligible 
to intervene and present relevant best interests evidence. We do not read 
section 78-30-4.13(11) as restricting those who maybe eligible to intervene 
in the adoption and present relevant best interests evidence to persons entitled 
to notice. Rather, section 78-30-4.13(11) authorizes intervention to persons 
who may "present evidence to the court relevant to t|ie best interest of the 
child." 
By expressly granting a right of intervention to other persons who have no 
parental interest in an adoptee, Utah Code section 78-30-4.13(11) manifests 
the unmistakable intention to ground standing to intervene on whether the 
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prospective intervenor can demonstrate an interest in or relevant evidence 
about the adoptee's best interests irrespective of parental status. 
Id. at 820-21. 
Seiverts contact with his children over the course of years and his payments of child 
support likely give him the status and circumstance to satisfy the standing to intervene 
and present "best interests" evidence. 
Good language from the case is: 
Our legislature has voiced a clear and consistent belief that the "best interest 
of a child" is defined to a substantial degree by the presence of a prompt, 
permanent, and secure parental attachment. As we said in Hardinger "The 
legislature has expressly provided that 'the state has a compelling interest in 
providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children ... [and] in 
preventing the disruption of adoptive placements/ and 'adoptive children 
have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive placements.' " 
Id. at 823. 
Because of the time spent with his children it can easily be argued that Seiverts has 
"a prompt, permanent, and secure parental attachment" with his children. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND QUASI-
ESTOPPEL, WAIVER AND LACHES DO NOT PREVENT 
ENFORCEMENT OF APPELLANT'S RELINQUISHMENT 
The court erred in failing to grant Mr. Sievert's motion to reconsider and vacate. 
Findings: Judge Hilder foxind that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not prevent 
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enforcement of Mr. Sievert's relinquishment. Furthermore, Judge Hilder found that from the 
record before him there is no indication that Mr. Sievert's post relinquishment behavior has 
led to an advantage on their behalf or disadvantage to Mr. Sieverts. Furthermore, the court 
found that Mr. Sievert's continued post relinquishment contact as atypical and the court did 
not find that it invokes principles of estoppel so as to defeat the plain language of the statute 
and the terms of the relinquishment itself. Marshaled evidence supporting findings: Judge 
Hilder made these findings by determining that Mr. Sieverts had no present parental status 
or rights and cannot obtain such rights by invoking an equitable doctrine. Questions of 
jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness, 
giving no particular deference to lower court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-
Rite. Inc., 201 UT App 347,37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38,39 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
Judge Hilder indicated that Mr. Sieverts estoppel claims were foreclosed by the lack 
of any evidence of inconsistent statements, acts, or admissions by petitioner and that the 
mother's position has been consistent throughout; seeking to bar any future claim for custody 
by Mr. Sieverts thereby allowing her the freedom to remarry and permit a future spouse to 
adopt the children. Furthermore, he made his finding on the basis that Mr. Sieverts provided 
no evidence or persuasive argument that he relied to his detriment upon petitioner's 
allegations, representations or actions when he signed his unequivocal relinquishment. Judge 
Hilder found that Mr. Sieverts was aware of the relinquishment, and was deemed to have 
understood the effects thereof. Judge Hilder erred in making these findings based on the fact 
that Mr. Sieverts had no opportunity to provide evidence or testify in the hearing. In making 
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these findings Judge Hilder relied on Celebrity Club, Inc. v. The Liquor Control Comm'n, 
602 P.2d 689,694 (Utah 1979) and Bott v. J.R. Shea Company, 299 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 
2000). Quoting, Stinnett v. Colorado Interstate Gas. Co., 227 F.3d 247,258 (5th Cir. 2000) 
and C&G Inc. v. Canyon Highway District 75 P.3d 194,199 (Idaho 2003) (citing, Floyd v. 
Bd. of Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 52 P.3d 863, 871 (2002) 
A fit parents relinquishment for adoption should be set aside "for fraud, undue 
influence and for a good cause shown " In re Adoption of K, 465 P.2d 541,542 (Utah 
1970) "or other grounds which would justify release from the obligations of any contract." 
Matter of S., 572 P.2d 1371,1374 (Utah 1977) quoting In re Adoption of F, 488 P.2d 130, 
133 (Utah 1971). 
In making his determination regarding equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel Judge 
Hilder failed to consider the jurisdictional requirements and implications as well as Judge 
Peuler's ruling and order, (see above, Point I). Judge Hilder also ruled that Mr. Sieverts' 
relinquishment "was effective when signed" but failed to consider or understand that Mr. 
Sieverts' rights and responsibilities are not terminated until the adoption decree is entered 
under Utah law. (See above Point II). Subsequent to the divorce, Mr. Sieverts continued to 
visit with the children and pay child support. Mr. Sieverts visited the children significantly 
more than he was entitled to under the Decree of Divorce and continued to pay child support. 
In addition to Mr. Sieverts' discussions with Appellee and Appellee's actions, Mr. Sieverts' 
had a very reasonable expectation that visitation would continue in accordance with the 
parties' Decree of Divorce based on Judge Peuler's October 15, 2005 ruling. 
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Because of Judge Hilder's err in not immediately granting Mr. Sieverts' Motion to 
Vacate, Mr. Sieverts has been deprived of any visitation with his children as provided in the 
Decree and subsequent order by Judge Peuler. The improper termination of visitation 
includes the deprivation of developing a relationship and bond with his children and enjoying 
the love and affection that comes with such relationships. Mr. Sieverts has continued to pay 
child support, yet lost out on the reduction in child support he was entitled to under the 
Decree for extended visitation pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.11. Mr. Sieverts was required to 
retain counsel and spend unnecessary time and money arguing his motion that should have 
been immediately granted. Mr. Sieverts has been severely disadvantaged because of the 
courts improper action and Appellee has been greatly advantaged. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge erred when he did not immediately grant Mr. Sieverts' Motion to 
Reconsider or Vacate. The trial judge erred when he denied Mr. Sieverts' Motion to 
Reconsider or Vacate. The trial judge erred when he accepted Appellee's Petition to 
Determine Parental Rights. The trial judge erred when he signed the Order Terminating 
Rights without notice and due process to Appellant. This court should reverse the trial 
court's Ruling and remand with instructions to vacate the relinquishment and Order 
Terminating Rights and bar Appellees from enforcing the reliiiquishment on these grounds. 
The trial judge erred by denying Mr. Sieverts his parental rights. The trial court should have 
set aside Mr. Sieverts' relinquishment and waiver for adoption because the court did not have 
grounds and jurisdiction to consider the matter and enter the Order on April 30,2007. The 
Court's Ruling improperly overturned Judge Peuler's Ruling where she had already denied 
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the Relinquishment and Waiver and ruled the original Decree of Divorce remain in full force 
and effect. Mr. Sieverts relied on this and continued his relationship with his children, 
including paying child support and spending time with the children in excess of that allowed 
in the parties' decree. After Judge Peuler rejected the attempted relinquishment Mr. Sieverts 
was justified in believing it was thereafter a nullity, or in the least he would receive notice 
and due process. This court should reverse the trial courts Ruling and Order Terminating 
Rights and remand with instructions to grant Mr. Sieverts' motion and vacate the 
relinquishment and restore Appellant's parental rights in accordance with the parties Decree 
of Divorce and Judge Peuler's Order of October 15, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of January, 2009. 
KING & KING 
By: W^^W-
JOSHIJ^ F. KING / \ 
Attorneys for Appellant ( ^s' 
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